tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post111394560090303463..comments2021-06-11T10:50:10.605-04:00Comments on The Web of Belief: Women in PhilosophyUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1117256836281988002005-05-28T01:07:00.000-04:002005-05-28T01:07:00.000-04:00Hello interesting stranger:Thanks for the comment....Hello interesting stranger:<BR/><BR/>Thanks for the comment. I would hesitate, however, to jump to the comparison you make between philosophy and mathematics (or science, for that matter). One thing I was assuming was that there is no clearly successful philosophical method. (Even among currently practicing philosophers, it seems like very few approach their subjects in exactly the same way, or handle discussion in the classroom in the same way.) It's also true that I'm primarily concerned (as far as this topic goes) with the way discussion is handled and not with the way ideas are treated, say, on paper. And it's not entirely clear that the success of any discipline need be tied to a specific method of classroom intruction.<BR/><BR/>I also think there are good reasons why philosophy needs to be tolerant of different methodologies, because of the special kind of thing philosophy is. It is questionable whether proofs can be made or evidence assembled in philosophy in the same way as in mathematics or science. Except in logic, it is not so clear when things are proven, or how to analyze the data. And though this may lead (obviously) to more room for dispute, it also suggests that the work of philosophy consists not in assembling proofs or data but in--I submit--finding new ways of looking at things; which goal demands that we tolerate various philosophical methods, and perhaps also methods of classroom instruction.Blakelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06747069493311023259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1114381132279777112005-04-24T18:18:00.000-04:002005-04-24T18:18:00.000-04:00I was just struggling to find graceful ways to res...I was just struggling to find graceful ways to respond to the question "Why do you think that?" (e.g. "Why do you think those instances of assertiveness are hostile?" --or, better, "Why do you perceive them that way?") And failing to find any.Blakelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06747069493311023259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1114309666663877132005-04-23T22:27:00.000-04:002005-04-23T22:27:00.000-04:00Blakely said. . ."self-assertion" [doesn not] impl...Blakely said. . .<BR/><BR/>"self-assertion" [doesn not] imply rhetoric. (It implies... assertiveness"<BR/><BR/>But why is this a problem, unless it is done in a completely indulgent way that detracts from the content of the assertions? Personally, I think a little more stylistic indulgence would make analytic philosophy a lot more interesting to read (my graders, apparently, disagree with me).<BR/><BR/>"It can be hard to articulate disagreement with premises that are not acknowledged, though it's something we learn to do better over time." <BR/><BR/>Fair enough. I guess I personally try, undoubtedly unsuccessfully, to integrate the "gathering" of unacknowledged premises into the actual argument / analysis. The problem is you end up with the opposite vice . . too much stage setting and not enough positive argument . . . My Professors have tended to train me away from that. . . but that may be part of the problem.Criminally Bulgurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05748737449040707271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1114300403232597832005-04-23T19:53:00.000-04:002005-04-23T19:53:00.000-04:00Disagreement is not necessarily combative. (Lots ...Disagreement is not necessarily combative. (Lots of things can be combative.) Nor does sincerity clearly have much to do with it, nor "self-assertion" imply rhetoric. (It implies... assertiveness.) <BR/><BR/>There <I>can</I> in analytic philosophy be an air of hostility that <I>can</I> (though it need not always) distract from the actual topics of conversation. <BR/><BR/>But what Richard noted was more to the point of my concerns--: philosophical conversations, and whole subfields of philosophy, have presuppositions. Oftentimes I think we're not even aware that they exist. It can be hard to articulate disagreement with premises that are not acknowledged, though it's something we learn to do better over time. This may not be related to gender at all, or it may be, if needing to know motives in order to follow a line of thought is gender-related.Blakelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06747069493311023259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1114292783906133832005-04-23T17:46:00.000-04:002005-04-23T17:46:00.000-04:00My concern is that people are understanding sincer...My concern is that people are understanding sincere expressions of disgreement as instances of "combativeness." Of course, many times philosophers fail to take the time to understand someone else's position, and therefore what they say against it will seem combative. But we are all stuck inside our individual epistemic frames of reference. If something doesn't make sense to us, then there is no other remedy, assuming we are after agreement grounded by truth, than expressing why it doesn't make sense to us. That doesn't need to mean "self-assertion," because the latter to me implies a use of rhetoric in lieu of rational argument. Frankly, I don't see much of that in good analytic philosophy.Criminally Bulgurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05748737449040707271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1114043264409960742005-04-20T20:27:00.000-04:002005-04-20T20:27:00.000-04:00Hi Richard,The point about motivation seems exactl...Hi Richard,<BR/><BR/>The point about motivation seems exactly right. It's easy to get caught up wondering why someone asks a certain question, and therefore not proceed with the line of thought it initiates. I tend to think: either there's something I don't know, or I should be suspicious. There's definite resistance to importing someone else's agenda. <BR/><BR/>Short of some extra knowledge about the subject at hand, though, it is hard to see what about what makes a philosophical question interesting could be conveyed. Nothing else but experience, that is; or possible experience. <BR/><BR/>Maybe it's fortunate that dispositions like these do lead to philosophical views. (Even if they aren't the best-liked views around.)Blakelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06747069493311023259noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-1113961039675359682005-04-19T21:37:00.000-04:002005-04-19T21:37:00.000-04:00No accusations. I wasn't setting out to complain ...No accusations. I wasn't setting out to complain (this hasn't genuinely bothered me for awhile), just to take note of something that girl philosophers wonder at from time to time. (It's also a subversive attempt to get them to comment on The Web of Belief.) <BR/><BR/>Actually the number of female: male analytic philosophers blogging is nothing to the ratio of analytic: continental philosophers blogging. Whatever that means.<BR/><BR/>The thing about the "currency of confidence" (whatever that exactly is) is that it cuts both ways. The conferral of respect is clearly a good and desirable thing, but if one must be very confident in order to obtain it, mixed feelings ensue in those who are less confident.<BR/><BR/>So much for the phenomenology of philosophy discussions.Blakelyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06747069493311023259noreply@blogger.com