tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post418615272289216746..comments2021-06-11T10:50:10.605-04:00Comments on The Web of Belief: Burge on Perceptual Systems and Veridicality (Part 2)Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-12436649505388229482008-02-23T00:05:00.000-05:002008-02-23T00:05:00.000-05:00The posts are about perceptual systems (human, gen...The posts are about <I>perceptual systems</I> (human, generally speaking) and there are many degrees of separation between the the mass of Mars, as object, and the human perceptual system. I suggest that a better example might be my perception of the light pole at one corner of the property here. I can see it. It is probably some 18' tall, made of wood, brown, etc. Now let's take a closer look at what it has to offer our conversation.<BR/><BR/>First, being able to see the "truth" of it would seem to have almost no value for the "ability to pass on one’s genes". Or doesn't it? To see brown once provided one's ancesters the ability to make out animals as they passed through underbrush. To be able to make out the brown and texture of wood -- often a difference of the slightest shades of the color -- prevented one from being paralyzed with fear that there was a bear behind every tree. Being able to tell height at a distance allowed one to navigate through the forest, distinguish distant objects from close. It also let one know how far to stand away in order not to be killed by a tree that is being felled.<BR/><BR/>"But don't we live in cities now?" it might be asked. "Aren't these reasons left behind?" Now the distinctions that were genetically selected serve us in other capacities. We still need to gauge distance from height. We need to be able to make out brown cars from their backgrounds. If there were no longer survival value to these aspects of perception they would be de-selected in favor of the perceptual system of those in the population who have other more useful perceptual abilities.<BR/><BR/>But let's look once more at this light pole. Hearing is a perceptual sense, as well. But my hearing it seems is an "untruthful" sense. It lies to me. That pole is making bunches of noise. It is evening here and the temperature change is causing the pole to contract. It is making inaudible (to humans), as the rule, crackling sounds. These compliment the crackling and the pity-pat of the tiny legs of the ants that have taken up residence in the pole. One can hear none of these things. Our hearing betray us!<BR/><BR/>But does it? There is no "reason" to hear these noises. It is only the very rare instance that a human being would have to hear them in order to pass along their genes. Hearing can only “lie” when it fails to assist one to pass along one’s genes.<BR/><BR/>My eyes don't see the infrared signature of the cooling either. Dear God, how did we ever get this far? But again, we are here because our ancesters needed to see in the visual spectrum, not the infrared, in order to have the highest chance of survival. The visual spectrum is "true".<BR/><BR/>When all is said and done, the "truth" about this light pole is <I>our</I> truth. Although, in the present context, that truth has no meaningful direct effect on one's ability to pass along one's genes, every quality by which we identify it <I>does</I>. If evolution hadn’t selected for any of those qualities we wouldn’t be able to see the tree from which the pole was made, much less the pole (which, of course, wouldn’t exist). This conversation would be entirely changed but the perception that underlay the new conversation would be <I>equally true</I>.<BR/><BR/>Furthermore, the brown in a painting is there because brown is one of the colors our evolution has selected for. One can <I>see</I> the brown in a photograph because multi-color emulsions (or color dots) were not considered sufficient unless they could render brown. <I>It's all resoundingly normative.</I> The only other building blocks that <I>might</I> be available are perceived qualities or entities that might persist because they are genetically neutral.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-2452403280050769382008-01-29T23:17:00.000-05:002008-01-29T23:17:00.000-05:00Gilbert: a belief is true if what is says is happe...Gilbert: a belief is true if what is says is happening in the world is actually happening in the world. It isn't all that vague.<BR/><BR/>E.g., 'Mars has no mass' is not true. The problem some people have with evolutionary approaches to reliable belief fixation is that promotion of fitness and truth are not necessarily the same, as the post says. For a silly example: a critter could evolve the belief that lightning is fire. This would probably promote its survival, but would be false.Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-50941378656506066252008-01-29T16:42:00.000-05:002008-01-29T16:42:00.000-05:00Why not just show that in fact, sensory systems ar...Why not just show that in fact, sensory systems are typically extremely accurate indicators of what is going on in the world? E.g., I can measure activity in a neuron, and observe that it tracks stimulus S with such-and-such degree of accuracy. I'm saying this shouldn't necessarily be a philosophical argument: the first empirical question is, How accurate, in fact, are sensory systems in tracking the world? <BR/><BR/>Indeed, Bill Bialek, a neuroscientist, has gotten a good deal of empirical mileage out of assuming that sensory neurons optimize information transmission, and uses this to predict various features of the neuronal response.<BR/><BR/>Since perceptual abilities rest on the abilities of our sensory systems, the leap from accurate sensory systems to reliable-enough perception seems less precipitous.Eric Thomsonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06847717704454032165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8965341.post-85130940909930057342007-12-23T23:15:00.000-05:002007-12-23T23:15:00.000-05:00"This seems to open up a lacuna between what the p..."This seems to open up a lacuna between what the perceptual system has been “designed” for—namely, to promote biological fitness—and its representational function—namely, to arrive at true beliefs."<BR/><BR/>Definitions!!! A term like "true beliefs" is impossibly vague. And the word "designed," even in quotes is troublesome. Are "true beliefs" those beliefs which when acted upon successfully procure food and enhance opportunities for procreation? If so, what's the problem? If not, then just what are they?<BR/><BR/>I realize that Burge is bound to have addressed these questions, but your text suggests that he has done so poorly. When an organism's perceptual apparatus gives it a survival advantage, it has either attained "true beliefs," by defintion, or the term is arguably meaningless. Admittedly, should that organism be a human being of the 21st century the context of existence is so much more sophisticated, and so much more social, that the "value" assigned to the variable "True Beliefs" is utterly changed, but the variable itself remains the same. The fact that the reward for "true beliefs" is delayed and the "value" greatly modified by repression, abstraction and a host of other psychological processes, only reflects the difficulty level of the enormously more sophisticated competition for survival.Gilbert Wesley Purdyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02612678869556343487noreply@blogger.com